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Enter the Dragon: Foreign Direct Investment Laws

and Policies in the P.R.C.
George 0. White III*
I.

Introduction

The People's Republic of China's (China) entry into the World
Trade Organization (WTO) forever changed the global foreign
direct investment (FDI) landscape. For China, with the largest
population in the world, this proved a momentous occasion. Even
before being accepted into the WTO, not to mention hosting the
Olympics and World Exposition, China was one of the premiere
FDI destinations in the world.
China is a country of vast opportunities and considered by
most foreign enterprises to be the last great commercial frontier.
For these reasons, foreign investors are eager to invest in large and
often complex projects and ventures, even without knowing what
laws apply or having the ability to understand China's complex
legal system. Thus, due to the complex regulatory framework and
business culture, commercial enterprises must be careful to
properly structure a sound investment project for ultimate success.
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II. Advantageous and Popular FDI Vehicles
When the Chinese government instituted the "open door

policy"' there was virtually no legal structure acting as a
regulatory mechanism. 2 There were also virtually no codified
laws or regulations pertaining to foreign commercial enterprise
ventures/investments. 3 Because of these endemic problems, the
Chinese government set out to create a conducive investment
environment by enacting laws and regulations providing foreign
investors certain "rights and interests."4
Since the passage of the Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint

Ventures of 1979' - the fundamental piece of legislation dealing
with foreign investment in China - the Chinese government has
passed over 200 laws and regulations relating to, for example,
foreign joint ventures, offshore oil exploration, foreign economic
contracts, mediation and arbitration proceedings, and Special
Economic Zones.' For example:
[i]t has been claimed.., that over the past 20 years (1979-99):
(1) the NPC [National People's Congress] and its Standing
Committee have examined and adopted a total of 327 laws and
decisions[;] (2) the State Council has enacted more than 750
administrative laws and regulations [;] and (3) the local People's
Congresses at various levels have formulated more than
53[,]000 local decrees. 7

It must also be mentioned that many countries have entered into
bilateral treaties with China for the purpose of protecting FDI

projects and ventures for their national enterprises.8
I Kui HUA WANG, CHINESE COMMERCIAL LAW § 3.1.1, at 83 (Trish Mann ed.,
2000).
2 See id at 83, 84 n.5.
3 See id. The terms "foreign enterprise," "venture," and "investor" are all
synonymous in this article.
4 Chang
Hung Tai, Investment Factors, in CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS: TRADE AND INVESTMENT § 2, at 19, 24 (K. C. D. M. Wilde ed., 2000).
5 Id.; see also Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Joint Equity
Enterprises, China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 6-500 (Apr. 4, 1990).
6 Tai, supra note 4, § 2, at 24.

supranote 1, § 3.1.1, at 83 n. 1.
8 Id. at 83-84 (stating that China has entered into forty-one bilateral treaties,
twenty-four of which are currently in force). Some of the countries that have enacted
such treaties are Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Sweden,
7 WANG,
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In addition to enacting new foreign investment laws to protect
foreign investors, the Chinese government also amended its
constitution,9 which was adopted in December 1982.' ° The
revision stated, "foreign enterprises, economic organizations and
individual entrepreneurs are permitted to invest in China and to
take part in various forms of economic cooperation with Chinese
enterprises and other economic organizations.""
The Chinese government also took a revolutionary step by
establishing the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation (MOFTEC). 12 MOFTEC was formed to administer13
China's foreign trade and economic cooperation arrangements.
It has a number of responsibilities including: (1) to formulate laws,
regulations, and policies; (2) to coordinate foreign trade,
investment, and economic development; (3) to form nationally
strategic plans; and (4) to administer all foreign investment
contracts, laws, and regulations. 14 Since China's opening-up, it is
estimated that MOFTEC has approved over 314,000 investment
projects, "but less than half of them have begun operating ....
These projects have a combined contractual foreign investment of
US$545.366 billion,
of which US$242.321 billion have already
15
invested."'
been
Among all of the important activities and functions that
MOFTEC has executed, the most important was the Catalogue for
the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries. 6 This system is
Finland, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand,
Indonesia, Vietnam, and Turkey. Id. at 84 n.3.
9 See Leontine D. Chuang, Investing in China's Telecommunication's Market:
Reflections on the Rule of Law and Foreign Investment in China, 20 Nw. J. INT'L. L. &
Bus. 509, 512 (2000).
10 See Tai, supra note 4, § 2, at 24.
''

Id.

12 See Chuang, supra note 9, at 512.
13 Id. This foreign ministry was originally named the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT). See Michael J. Moser, Foreign Investment
in China: The Legal Framework, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW IN THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 90, 91 (Michael J. Moser ed., Oxford University Press 2nd
ed. 1987).
14 Chuang, supra note 9, at 512.
15 WANG, supra note 1, § 3.1.2, at 85.
16 Id. § 3.1.5, at 93.
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vitally important because it serves as a guide for all foreign
investors and lists the industries in which foreign investment is
"encouraged, restricted, or prohibited."'' 7 However, unless the
catalogue is quickly modified to meet WTO specifications, it will
become defunct and eventually be replaced by WTO guidelines
and agreements. 8
The two most popular forms of FDI encouraged by the
Chinese government are equity joint ventures and wholly foreignowned enterprises (100% foreign-owned enterprises). 19 These two
forms of FDI are the primary mechanisms by which foreignowned enterprises structure their investments and operate. They
comprise an overwhelming majority of all FDI vehicles. It must
be noted that these investment vehicles have been revised and
amended on numerous occasions. The most recent revisions were
authorized in April of 2001.2°
A. Wholly Foreign-OwnedEnterprises
Wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) are formed by
foreign investors with their own capital under Chinese law,
without a Chinese partner involved in the investment.2 ' WFOEs
are generally formed as limited liability companies.2 z As limited
liability companies, WFOEs become "legal persons" under the

17 Id.
18 See id.; see also Wei Gu, China Enters The WTO, GLOBAL FIN., Nov. 1, 2001, at
59 (describing that China's membership in the WTO will force it to open its "severely
restricted distribution channels" and that this "will be the most profound change for
foreign investors").
19 See generally RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., LAW AND POLITICS IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 403-04 (Ralph H. Folsom ed., West 1992); see also WANG,supra
note 1,§ 3.1.1, at 84 & n.4.
20 See International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign
Investment Laws: Changes, May 2001, at http://web.ita.doc.gov/ticwebsite/apweb.nsf
(June 13, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
21 See Gary J. Dernelle, Direct Foreign Investment and ContractualRelations in
the People's Republic of China, 6 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 331, 339 (1994); see also The Law
of the People's Republic of China Concerning Enterprises with Sole Foreign Investment,
China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 13-506 (Apr. 12, 1986).
22 See Stephen C. Curley & Darren R. Fortunato, Tax Considerationsfor Investors
in China: A PreliminaryLook, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 531, 545 (1995).
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1986 Chinese Civil Law.23 Therefore, a WFOE may possess "the
corporate characteristics of continuity of life, centralization of
management, and free transferability of interests., 24 But, "mergers
and other important changes in WFOEs must be approved by the
relevant Chinese authorities. 25
These investment vehicles originated from legislation adopted
on April 12, 1986, at the fourth session of the Sixth National
People's Congress (NPC). 26 At this session it was stated that:
[w]ith a view to expanding economic cooperation and
technological exchange with other countries, and promoting the
development of its national economy, the People's Republic of
China permits foreign firms, other economic entities or
individuals.., to set up enterprises exclusively with foreign
capital in China, and protects the lawful rights and interests of
the enterprises so established.27
Before the WFOE law came into existence, very few companies
were permitted to conduct any form of business in China via a
wholly owned subsidiary model.28 Virtually all FDI was required
to be within the confines of Special Economic Zones (SEZs).29
23 See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 19,

§ 9, at 404.

24 Curley & Fortunato, supra note 22, at 545.
25 Id.

26 See Tai, supra note 4, § 2, at 30.
Under Article 57 of the Constitution of the PRC, the NPC is the highest State
legislative body. It is entitled to amend the Constitution and also to enact and
amend basic laws concerning criminal offences, civil affairs, State organs, [etc.]
.... [The NPC has a permanent standing committee called "The Standing
Committee."] There are approximately 3000 members comprising the NPC.
Members hold office for a term of five years .... The full NPC meets once a
year for a period of 1 or 2 weeks. In theory, the NPC plays the role of
parliament in the PRC. It is the highest organ of State power .... Apart from
its legislative power, the NPC also has the power to: (a) appoint and remove
leaders and members of the highest State organs, (b) make decisions on national
development plans and the State budget, and (c) supervise the implementation
of the Constitution.
WANG, supra note 1, § 1.2.4.2, at 20-21.
27 Tai, supra note 4, § 2, at 30 (quoting Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waizi Qiye
Fa [The Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Wholly Foreign-Owned
Enterprises]);see also Preston M. Tolbert, Wholly Foreign-OwnedEnterprises Come of
Age, CHINA Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1986, at 50, 52-53.
28 Tai, supra note 4, § 2, at 30.
29 See id. at 30-31.
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WFOEs are now the wave of the future for FDI in China. Today,
with the new and improved FDI regulations in place, WFOEs are
by far the most popular investment vehicle for foreign investors in
terms of contracts signed and projects developed.3" In 2000, "over
40 percent more WFOE contracts than joint venture contracts were
signed, and the value of contracted investment in WFOEs was 70
percent more than ... joint ventures ....

""

The reasons for WFOE popularity are simple and obvious.
While the other two major investment vehicles3 2 allow for certain
advantages, they also have a significant number of disadvantages.
For instance, Equity Joint Venture Law (EJVL)33 requires that

foreign investors use certain equipment in investment that is
"appropriate" to the needs of the Chinese government.3 4 Also,
something that has become extremely controversial and quite
problematic for many foreign investors is that the EJVL requires
foreign investors to allow their Chinese partners access to all
pertinent documentation regarding such things as industrial
property and know-how (i.e., research and development).35 This
requires "including photocopies of patent certificates or trademark
registration certificates, statements of validity, [and] their
technical characteristics and practical value."36 These disclosures
37

must be annexed to the joint venture contract.

30 Foreign Investment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 20; see James Kynge
& Edward Young, Wal-Mart Wins Go-Aheadfor Beijing Opening, FrN. TtMES, Nov. 8,
2001, at 29 (describing the fact that Wal-Mart, a U.S. retail company, has already opened
its first supermarket in Beijing and has secured permission from the Chinese government

to open five more supermarkets in Beijing within the next few years). Wal-Mart has
already opened several stores in the cities of Shenzhen, Kunming, Fuzhou, Dalian,

Shenyang, Shantou, and Dongguan (fifteen stores altogether).

Id. These stores are

WFOEs. See id.
31 ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 20.
32 See infra Part I1.B.
33 WANG, supranote 1, § 3.2.1, at 94.
34 Id. § 4.8.3, at 130.

35 See id.

36 Id. Consider the possible ramifications of these measures in today's world of
economic and corporate espionage.
37 See id.

2003]

FDI

LAWS AND POLICIES IN THE

P.R.C.

1. Recent WFOE Law Revisions Positively Affecting FDI
In October 2000, the NPC agreed to various revisions of the
WFOE law and subsequently approved implementing regulations
in April 2001 .3 These revisions were predominantly very positive
and pragmatic. 9 Some of the most important positive revisions
were the elimination or revocation of: (1) export performance
requirements (i.e., "rules that required companies to export certain
percentages of [their] product[s]" 4"); (2) advanced technology and
import substitution requirements that a WFOE must use "to
develop new products, promote conservation, and upgrade
products for import substitution";4 (3) foreign exchange balance
requirements demanding "that WFOEs balance their foreign
exchange receipts and expenditures";42 (4) prohibitions opposing
WFOE direct domestic sales of products without prior government
approval;43 (5) the prerequisite "that raw materials and fuel for
WFOEs be obtained solely within China unless unavailable from
the domestic market" 44 and the requirement that "imports of
capital equipment and technology" be used from the domestic
economy";45 (6) the requirement that "WFOEs submit production

38 Foreign Investment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 20. Please note that

Chinese laws are generally drafted very ubiquitously; implementing regulations are, on
top of the Chinese laws, approved to provide more thorough and detailed guidance. See
generally id.
39 See International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, China
Country Commercial Guide FY 2002, Chapter 7: Investment Climate Statement, at
http://www.usatrade.gov/website/ccg.nsfOpenDatabase (last visited Sept. 19, 2003).
40 ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 20. Now, exports are

generally encouraged but not obligatory. Id. However, "[Ilt is unclear whether export
performance requirements contained in existing contracts [will] remain valid." Id.
41 Id. The new law merely encourages these activities. Id.
42 Id.

"The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) had not seriously

enforced the balancing requirement in recent years, reflecting China's relatively strong
foreign exchange reserves. Nevertheless, the law had remained on the books." Id.
43 See id. This is one of the most monumental steps the Chinese government has
taken to date with regard to the open door policy and restructuring of its FDI laws in an
effort to crystallize foreign investor confidence and harmonize its laws with those of
many western countries.
44 Id.

45 Id. This was, again, an incredible leap forward for the Chinese government to
make.
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and operation plans to local authorities";46 (7) the requirement that
"WFOEs sell products in accordance with China's price control
regulations or record the prices with price control and tax
authorities";47 and (8) the law regarding particular "limitations or
prohibitions to WFOE investment in certain business lines,
including media, real estate, communications and transportation,
'
and public utilities."48
Now, most of the provisions relating to "limitations or
prohibitions" will be published annually in the Catalogue for the
Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries, guiding foreign
investment in the particular industries listed.49 To say the least, the
changes recently made in the WFOE laws were colossal steps by
the Chinese government in showing the world that they are now
extremely serious about restructuring their FDI laws for the
purpose of opening up to the rest of the world and fostering
positive investor sentiment.50
Essentially, the basic underlying theme spelled out by the
WFOE laws is that these enterprises will be developed while
taking China's national economy into consideration."
In many
circumstances, although these requirements are changing at a very
rapid pace, WFOEs can be in areas such as advanced technology
and equipment "[and/]or [be willing to] market all or most of their
products outside China., 52 Furthermore, to date, the progressive
WFOE model for FDI in China allows for complete protection of
the investment, profits derived from the investment, and rights and
interests of the foreign investor under Chinese law.53

46 Id.; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text (regarding comments made
about "opening-up").
47 ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 20.
48 Id.
49 See id.; see also supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (explaining the
importance and risk to the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries).
50 See generally supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text (describing the radical
changes made by the Chinese government).
51 See Tai, supra note 4, § 2, at 31-32.
52 Id. at 32. But see supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text (describing the
restrictions previously placed on WFOEs).
53 Tai, supra note 4, § 2, at 32.
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2. The WFOE Screening Process
Because there is not much of a mechanism for regulatory
supervision by governmental authorities once the WFOE has been
approved, WFOEs are not a favorite foreign investment vehicle for
Chinese regulators.54 As a result, the foreign investor interested in
this form of investment vehicle must go through a stricter form of
approval process, compared to vehicles like Equity Joint
Ventures."
There is a ninety-day approval process for WFOEs, for which
application to at least two approving authorities is required. 6 The
initial step is for the foreign investor to apply to the local
government authority (above the county level).5 7 The application
should contain details such as: (1) "the purpose[,] ... scope and
scale of operations";5 8 (2) what is to be produced and/or
manufactured and what types of technology and equipment are to
be used;5 9 (3) the expected percentage of output overseas versus to
domestic markets;6" (4) "area of land and land requirements";61
and (5) infrastructure prerequisites required for the enterprise to
stay viable (i.e., water, fuel, public utility, electricity, coal, gas,
etc., requirements).62
Upon receipt of the report, the local
government agency is normally given thirty days to make a final
determination regarding the feasibility of the proposed WFOE.6 3
If and when the local authority approves the proposed project
(i.e., preliminary approval), the foreign investor is required to
apply for final approval, depending on the situation, locality, and
type of enterprise.64 Extensive documentation is necessary for the
54 See generally WANG, supra note 1, § 4.9.1, at 131.
55 See id. § 4.9.1, at 132.
56 See id.§ 4.9.2-4, at 132-33; see also FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 19, § 9, at 403.
57 See WANG, supra note 1, § 4.9.2, at 132.
58 Id.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 Id.
62 See id

63 Id.
64 See John Zhengdong Huang, China on the Horizon: Exploring Current Legal
Issues: An Introduction to Foreign Investment Laws in the People's Republic of China,
28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 471, 478-79 (1995).
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final approval process:
Foreign companies are required to submit an application to the
relevant authorities, together with the following documents: (1)
a feasibility study; (2) articles of association of the enterprise;
(3) a list of legal representatives or candidates for the board of
directors; (4) evidence of the foreign investor's legal
certification and credit standing; (5) the written response of the
local government, at county level or above, in the locality of the
proposed enterprise; (6) a detailed list of goods and materials
needed to be imported; and (7) other necessary documents.65
All of these documents must either be written or translated in
Mandarin Chinese.6 6
The safest and most conducive way to be granted approval by
MOFTEC is to specify in the formal application that the
investment and/or project involves certain manifest aims which
could include, among other things, aiding with the development of
the Chinese economy, helping to create an ecologically sustainable
development, using high technology and equipment, and/or
exporting the majority of all the products produced in China to
other countries.6 7
Once the application has been approved and an approval
certificate has been issued by MOFTEC, the applicant must file,
within thirty days, a written request to register the enterprise and
to receive a business license with the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce (SAIC).6 8 When a business license has
been issued by SAIC, thereby legitimizing the enterprise, the
WFOE must register with the local tax authority "within 30 days
of receiving the business license."69 The foreign investor should
propose the general terms for which the enterprise will operate in
the application to SAIC.7 ° These terms of operation will also be
65 Id.; see also WANG, supra note 1, § 4.9.3, at 132.
66 See John S. Mo,

International Foreign Investment Law, in INTRODUCTION TO

CHINESE LAW 283 (Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu eds., 1997); see also WANG,

supra note 1, § 4.9.3, at 133.
67 Wang, supra note 1, § 4.9.5, at 133. Most interesting here is the precept of
positive approval based on the guarantee that most of the products produced will be
exported.
68 See Huang, supra note 64, at 479.
69 WANG, supra note 1, § 4.9.6, at 134.
70 See Huang, supra note 64, at 479.
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subject to approval by the government.7 Finally, "[n]o minimum
capital requirements will be imposed, 7 2 and the sum of registered
capital that the enterprise will use to start its operations must
coincide with the scale and scope of operations.73
It must be noted that there are certain sectors of industry in
which WFOEs are either heavily discouraged or altogether
barred.74 WFOEs are heavily discouraged from operating in the
sectors of transport facilities, public utilities, real estate, leasing
and trust investment.75 If a potential WFOE attempts to enter one
of these sectors, MOFTEC will strictly scrutinize the application
during the approval process.76 On the other hand, potential
WFOEs are altogether prohibited from applying for investment
approval in the sectors of newspapers, publishing, broadcasting,
television or films;77 domestic commerce,78 foreign trade or

71 See id.
72

Id.

73

See id.

See WANG, supra note 1, § 4.10.2, at 135-36 (stating that FDI in various
industrial sectors is generally divided up into four main sectors: encouraged, permitted,
restricted, and prohibited).
75 See id.
76 See id.
74

77 Id. But see, e.g., Around the World Chairman Murdock Strikes a Deal, 17
2002, at 14.

EARTH ISLAND J.1, Spring

News Corp. media mogul Rupert Murdoch has finally attained his long-sought
goal of extending his communications empire to China. Murdock's Star TV has
been granted permission to transmit to cable viewers in 'arestricted area in
Guangdong province.' China asked only one thing in return: that Murdoch
ensure that a China Central Television channel be widely available in the U.S.
To accommodate China's rulers, Murdoch removed the BBC broadcast
documentaries critical of the Chinese government. Star TV's pitch was
doubtless enhanced when Murdoch's son ... openly criticized the Falun Gong,
an outlawed religious movement that has been brutally suppressed by Beijing.
Id.
78 See WANG, supra note 1, § 4.10.2, at 135. But see, e.g., supra note 30 and
accompanying text (discussing Wal-Mart's decisive entry into the Chinese commercial
market). Also, other foreign international commercial supermarket chains, such as
Carrefour, a French conglomerate, have been acting within the Chinese domestic "scene"
for some time now. See Kynge & Young, supra note 30, at 29. So there are exceptions
to the rule. See id; see also Mike Troy, Wal-Mart to Open Five in Beying, DSN
RETAILING TODAY, Nov. 19, 2001, at 2 (stating that because of China's admittance into
the WTO, there will be fewer restrictions on foreign business ownership). And, in the
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insurance; postal services and telecommunications;7 9 and "other
industries that the Chinese [g]overnment prohibits a sole
investment enterprise from establishing."8
B. Equity Joint Ventures
Until recently, before the wholly owned foreign enterprise
became the new "hot" investment vehicle for both foreign
investors and their Chinese counterparts,8" equity joint ventures
(EJVs), traditionally received the most attention. The first series
of joint venture laws, Law of the People's Republic of China on
82 was adopted on July 1,
Sino-Foreign Joint Equity Enterprises,
People's Congress 83

1979, "at the 2nd Session of the 5th National
and was later amended on April 4, 1990, "at the 3rd Session of the
7th National People's Congress."84 These laws came about by the
advent of normalized trade relations between the United States and
China in 1979 and were designed to attract foreign investment,

near future there will be "'reduced import taxes, upgraded distribution infrastructure and
more foreign investment ... ' Id.(quoting Linda Kristiansen of UBS Warburg).
79 See WANG, supra note 1, § 4.10.2, at 135. But see, e.g., Shu-Ching Jean Chen,
Goldman, News Corp. in Limbo After Chinese Telco Ruling, THE DAILY DEAL (Dec. 27,
2001), at http://www.thedeal.com (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
In February 2001, two foreign investors (along with two politically wellconnected Chinese commercial banks...) made the first direct equity
investment in China's still protected telecom sector. The two foreign investors
splashed out $325 million for a combined 12% stake in China Netcom Corp.
Ltd., a telecom upstart set to challenge State-owned monolith China Telecom.
Id.While this is basically a joint venture, and not a WFOE, it still represents the fact
that while the telecommunications sector is considered off limits to FDI, there are
exceptions. See id.; see also infra Part Il.B. (describing equity joint ventures in detail).
80 WANG, supra note 1, § 4.10.2, at 135.
81 See generally Moser, supra note 13, at 100; see also ForeignInvestment Laws:
Changes, May 2001, supra note 20 (stating that Joint Ventures are now considered the
second most popular foreign investment vehicle in China, behind the Wholly Foreign
Owned Enterprise).
82 Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Joint Equity Enterprises,
China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.) T 6-500 (Apr. 4, 1990).
83 WANG, supra note 1, § 3.2.1, at 94.
84 Id. § 3.2.1, at 94-95. A conclusive Chinese text of these sessions, with an
English translation, can be found in CHINA'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC LEGISLATION 1-7
(Foreign Languages Press 1982).
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capital, and expertise (i.e., know-how).85 Since that time, EJVs
have been a major form of foreign investment. By 1987, over
3,210 EJVs were established in China.86 EJVs quickly became the
main FDI tool for ventures between Chinese and foreign
enterprises and as a result, the EJV laws are by far the most
developed of all Chinese foreign investment laws.87 EJVs are now
only second in popularity to WFOEs.88
While there is no true definition of what an EJV should
actually be, there are some criteria establishing its basic
characteristics. These include such characteristics as: (1) both the
foreign and Chinese parties (EJV partners) should share in the
profits of the enterprise, along with bearing the risks of loss, in
proportion to their contribution of registered capital; 89 (2) the EV
should be "established within China's territory in accordance with
relevant Chinese law and subject to the jurisdiction and protection
of Chinese law";9" (3) the EJV should be registered as a Chinese
legal person by taking the form of a limited liability enterprise; 9
and (4) the foreign investor must have contributed not less than
twenty-five percent of the venture's registered capital. 92 Once an
EJV has registered with the Chinese authorities, it cannot reduce
its registered capital.93 Also, if an EJV wants to subsequently
increase its registered capital, both the EJV's board of directors
and the government authority who originally examined and
approved the venture (i.e., the Registration and Administration
Office for the Establishment of the EJV) must approve the
increased capital.94 Nonetheless, to be economically feasible, an
85 See generally FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 19, 403-04.
86 See id.

87 See Moser, supra note 13, at 101.
88 Id.

89 See WANG, supra note 1, § 3.2.2, at 95.
90 Id.
91 See id.

92 See Curley & Fortunato, supra note 22, at 534. Registered capital is the total
amount of the contributed capital that has been registered at the Chinese government's
Registration and Administration Office for the Establishment of the Equity Joint Venture
and "is the total amount of capital subscribed by the parties." Id. at 534 n.9.
93 See id. at 535.
94 See id
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EJV is expected to assist- with the development of China's
economy and carry out at least one of a number of possible
positive tasks, including: (1) "adopt[ing] advanced technical
equipment and scientific management";95 (2) promot[ing]
commercial and technological renovation;9 6 (3) "produc[ing]
export oriented products";97 and/or (4) provid[ing] the means for
organizing and training managerial and technical personnel. 98
These tasks must not only be "advanced" in nature, but must also
be in line with China's economic needs. 99
1. Recent Equity Joint Venture Law Revisions Positively
Affecting FDI
Until recently, foreign investors favored using the EJV
vehicle."' 0 EJVs were seen by the Chinese government as a way to
prop up under-performing and ailing domestic enterprises."0 ' In a
nutshell, EJVs were a sort of "rescue package" handed to the
enterprise by the government at the bequest of the foreign
investor. In March 2001, the NPC made some minor revisions to
the Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-ForeignJoint
Equity Enterprises.0 2 While the changes were relatively minor in
nature, the Chinese media characterized the revisions as "a
milestone in the country's quest to provide a legal framework that
10 3
will better serve the development of joint ventures in China.
But this new EJV law has yet to be finalized or implemented. 4
Due to China's admittance into the WTO, it is soon expected that

95
96

Huang, supra note 64, at 474-75; WANG, supra note 1, § 3.2.2, at 96.
See Huang, supra note 64, at 474-75; see also, e.g., WANG, supra note 1, § 3.2.2,

at 96.
97

See Huang, supra note 64, at 474-75; see also, e.g., WANG, supra note 1, § 3.2.2,

at 96.
98

See Huang, supra note 64, at 474-75; see also, e.g., WANG, supra note 1, § 3.2.2,

at 96.
99 See WANG, supra note 1, § 3.2.2, at 96.
100

See supra Part I.B.

101 See ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 20.
102 See id.; see also supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing the
amendments to the law).
103 Foreign Investment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supra note 20.
104 See id.
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more precise and sweeping amendments will be approved to
provide healthier incentives to potential foreign investors. 105
To date, several positive and pragmatic revisions of the
amended EJV law have been made. For instance, the requirement
that EJVs "either procure raw materials, fuel and some capital
goods from the domestic market or source from the international
06
market using on-hand foreign currency" has been deleted.1
Instead, the amended law allows sourcing from the international
market, but adds the provision that the procurement process must
be done in a manner that effectuates "probity and impartiality. °7
In addition, the requirement that ENs must "file production
[and/or] business plans with government offices and implement
plans through business contracts" has also been deleted.0 8
Finally, the provision that all insurance plans for an EN must be
provided by a Chinese insurance company has been changed to
require that the insurance provider be located in the territory where
the enterprise is operating.'0 9
2. The EJV Screening Process
The first and most basic step of an interested potential foreign
investor is to locate an appropriate partner."0 Obviously, this first
step is essential and absolutely crucial in developing a viable EJV.
This first step is a relatively simple one, especially since China is
in great need of foreign capital infusions and western
technologies."' The immense demand for these resources, by way
105 See State to Revise Related Laws for New FDI Model, ASIAINFO DAILY CHINA

NEWS, Sept. 26, 2001, at 1.

"China examined over 1,500 laws, regulations and

documents.., and found that over 500 of them should be eliminated, 200 should be

revised according to... WTO rules, and over 20 new regulations should be laid down."
Id.China has worked to "revamp" the "laws concerning foreign-funded enterprises that
did not adhered to WTO rules." Id.
106 ForeignInvestment Laws: Changes, May 2001, supranote 20.
107 See id.
108 Id. This is a remarkable and rather progressive amendment showing the

government's willingness to allow some form of foreign investment autonomy. See id.
It is also more of a counter-strike against what the WTO will soon be demanding.
109 See State to Revise RelatedLaws for New FDI Model, supra note 105.
110 See generally, e.g., Keqiang Guo & Kaiyman Tao, The Chinese-ForeignJoint
Venture: Law and Practice, 3 D.C.L.J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 309, 317-19 (1994).
111 See generally supra Part II (explaining how FDI is steadily increasing and
describing the vastness of the Chinese FDI market).
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of FDI, is far greater than'the present supply. 112 Thus, as the
government hastily opens the doors at China's gates, most of the
domestic Chinese companies are lying in wait for opportunities to
establish EJNs with foreign enterprises so they too can enjoy the
potential profits and derivative benefits of such an undertaking." 3
For example:
China is likely to have a domestic television industry strong
enough to be a big export [sic] of cheap sets. Japanese firms
will have a stake in that... : they are providing the technology
now. Toshiba, Japan Victor Company Matsushita, Sanyo and
Sony are all starting joint ventures with Chinese partners. Of the
2.8m sets sold last year, 1.5m were supplied by domestic joint
ventures, the biggest of which is Hitachi's at Fujian.14
An EJV must be approved by MOFTEC or local authorities
before it can be established." 5 In order for an EJV to be
preliminarily approved, certain procedures must be followed and
materials provided by the Chinese partner, including: (1) an
application for the establishment of the EJV; (2) an EJV
agreement and articles of association signed by agents (authorized
representatives) of the proposed venture; (3) a joint feasibility
study report; (4) a project proposal; (5) a letter of intent or
memorandum of understanding providing not that there exists a
binding agreement, but simply evidencing the parties' intent; (6) a
list of candidates for board of directors and highest executive
positions; and (7) various written opinions by local government
agencies for the jurisdiction where the proposed EJV is to be
established." 6
All of these documents must be written in

112 See generally Mo, supra note 66, at 275 (discussing the relatively large currency

reserve China has established).
113 See WANG, supra note 1, § 3.3.1.1, at 98.
114 Tai, supra note 4, § 2, at 29 (citing a relatively old, yet very relevant quote from
ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1985); see also Karby Leggett & Paul Becket, A Global Journal
Report: Citigroup Inc. Deal With Chinese Bank Would Be Milestone, WALL ST. J., Aug.

21, 2002, at CI (highlighting the fact that even major investment banks, such as
Citigroup, Inc., are partnering-up with local Chinese banks and financial institutions in
creating joint ventures).
115 See Huang, supra note 64, at 475. Authorized local authorities can mean
provincial, county, township, etc. Id. Each level of government may approve foreign
investments, depending on the size. Id.
116 Id.
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Mandarin Chinese.'17 After the application has been reviewed and
approved by authorized local authorities, it must then be submitted
to MOFTEC for final approval." 8 MOFTEC has three months to
make a final determination." 9 However, the time for approval can
be extended if the Chinese authorities find something needing
further investigation. 120 Finally, if approved, the parties to the EN
must conduct work relevant to the feasibility study, negotiate and
other related contracts, and posit the
sign an EJV agreement and
2
'
incorporation.'
articles of
There are a number of principal causes why projects are
generally denied. The main reasons for denial of an EJV are: (1)
"detriment[] to China's sovereignty"; 122 (2) violation of Chinese
law; 123 (3) "non-conformity with the requirements for the
development of China's economy"; 124 (4) potential propagation of
in the
environmental pollution; 125 and/or (5) unconscionability
126
enterprise.
foreign
and
Chinese
the
between
agreement
Once a certificate of approval to establish an EJV has been
received, an EJV is required to register with the local bureau of the
State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC). 127 This
must be done within one month of receipt of the certificate of
approval. 28 When applying for registration, the parties to the EJV
should provide:
(1) the document of approval; (2) copies of the Chinese and
117

See id.

118

SeeWANG,supra note 1, § 3.3.1.2, at 99.

119 Seeid § 3.3.1.2, at 100.
See Guo & Tao, supra note 110, at 320. Due to the slow bureaucratic machinery
at work, this could take some time. See id.
120

121

See id.

122 WANG,

123
124

supra note 1, § 3.5.2.2, at 108-09.

See id.
Id.

See id. Environmental pollution is an especially "hot" item on the list due to the
fact that Beijing is trying extremely hard to clean up the environment and strengthen
environmental regulations before the 2008 Olympics in China. See Angela Leary,
Ready, Set, Go, ASIAN Bus., Oct. 2001, at 60.
126 WANG, supra note 1, § 3.5.2.2, at 108-09.
125

127

See Huang, supra note 64, at 475.

128

See id,
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foreign language [EJV] texts of the joint venture agreement, the
joint venture contract, and the company charter; (3) a copy of

the foreign party's business license or other similar
documents... ; and (4) a complete registration form, in
triplicate ....

The day when the business license for operation has been issued is
the day that the investment becomes a legal entity with protection
under the Chinese laws. 13' Generally speaking, it takes anywhere
from six to twelve months, from beginning to end, for this process
to transpire."'
While not going into detail regarding percentages of capital
contributions as to the value of the investment or standards of
registration fees, it is important to note a few important fine points
on EJV capital contribution regulations. It is essential that the
parties applying for the EJV pledge their own capital for the
venture. 132 This means that the capital pledged should be free of
all encumbrances - not mortgaged, have a lien placed against it, or
be secured by a creditor.'33 Capital contributions can be in the
form of cash, equipment, buildings, and/or intangible property
such as expertise and know-how, intellectual property, and land
use rights. 134 If a form of investment other than cash is proposed,
both parties must agree on the form and the authorized
examination and approval authority must approve it. 135
C. Wholly Foreign-OwnedEnterprises Versus Equity Joint
Ventures
There are many advantages and disadvantages to choosing an
EJV over a WFOE. The most obvious advantage is that having a
Chinese party involved in the EJV is very helpful in obtaining the
necessary
government
approvals
to
necessitate
the
project/investment.
This results from the Chinese partner's

129

Id.

130 See Guo & Tao, supra note 110, at 320.
131 See generally Huang, supra note 64, at 475.
132 See Guo & Tao, supra note 110, at 320.
133 See id.
134 See generally WANG, supra note 1, § 3.4.3, at 106-07.

135 See id. § 3.4.3, at 107.
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guanxi136 and familiarity with the complex procedures inherent in
dealing with the multi-layered Chinese bureaucracy.'
On the
other hand, there are also some major disadvantages to developing
an EJV (compared to a WFOE). The most obvious disadvantage
is that the foreign investor has to "transfer" technology and knowhow over to the Chinese party (essentially a sharing of assets,
including, e.g., research and development activities) at the behest
of the foreign investor.'38 Foreign investors also have to consult
with the Chinese partner when dealing with management, facility,
and production issues.'39 Lastly, the Chinese government has
significantly
more oversight and control over an EJV than it does a
40
WFOE.1

D. "Special Areas"

-

Special Economic Zones and Coastal

Economic Open Areas
A major by-product of China's "open door policy" is the
highly publicized development of "special areas" including
"Special Economic Zones" (SEZs) and "Coastal Economic Open
Areas [(CEOAs)].''

SEZs are clever tools used by the Chinese

government with the main purpose of acting "as 'windows' to the
outside world."' 142 They exist, for the most part, to create domestic
136 Telephone Interview with Dr. Ronald R. Robel, Director, Critical Languages
Center; Director, International Honors Program; Director, Asian Studies Program,
University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Ala. (Feb. 27, 2003) (stating that guanxi are
connections fostered via friendships - in China these take considerable time and skill in
developing, especially at high levels); see also Bee Chen Goh, Trade and Investment
Negotiation with the Chinese, in CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: TRADE AND

INVESTMENT § 3, at 39 (K. C. D. M. Wilde ed., 2000) (explaining that many businesses
start off business relations by way of relying on guanxi).
137 See WANG, supra note 1, § 3.2.5, at 97-98.
138 See supra Part II.A.
139 See WANG, supra note 1,§ 3.2.5, at 97-98.
140 See id.
141

See, e.g., Elson Pow & Michael J. Moser, Law and Investment in China's

Special Investment Areas, in FOREIGN TRADE,

INVESTMENT,

AND THE LAW IN THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 199 (Michael J. Moser ed., Oxford University Press 2nd

ed. 1987).
142 Raymond W.K. Lau, Book Review, 75 Supp. HEAD & HAND 128, 128-30 (1999)
(reviewing WEIPENG WU, PIONEERING ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA'S SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONES (1999)). See Mark B. Baker, Forgotten Legal China, 17 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 363, 389 (1995) (noting that the basic policy for SEZs was to experiment with
the market economy and to attract foreign investments).

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 29

employment opportunities and to draw in much needed know-how
and technology by way of FDI. 4 3 SEZs are essentially defined
areas existing throughout China that offer numerous and rather
large forms of special incentives and preferential treatment to
foreign investors located within the specified area. Two broad
principles guide SEZ operation: (1) "foreign investors and
enterprises located in the special areas are to enjoy preferential
treatment in the form of lower tax rates and easier entry and exit
procedures ' 44 and (2) "local government authorities are to have
greater decision-making power than as previously available to
them in China."' 45
To date, several "special areas" have been administered. All
of these areas benefit from special regulations and policies that
highlight each particular area's comparative advantage.1 46 They
include the five SEZs (Shenzhen - the first, largest, and most
successful of the SEZs - Shantou, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Hainan
Island), 147 and fourteen CEOAs 141 that were opened as part of the
143 See Lau, supra note 142, at 128-30.
144 Id.; see also Curley & Fortunato, supra note 22, at 551. "The income tax rate on
a Foreign Investment Enterprise and a Foreign Enterprise with an establishment or site in
China engaged in production or business operations... may be entitled to various tax
rate reductions and/or holidays depending on the requirements of the region in which
they are established." Id.
145 Id.

146 See Bin Xue Sang, Another Special Economic Zone in China? - An Analysis of
the Special Regulations and Policyfor Shanghai'sPudong New Area, 14 J. INTL. L. Bus.
130 n.3 (1993). A comparative advantage is:
when a particular country, while maybe not as efficient as other countries,
focuses on what it does best - and invests in what it does best - even though it
may still produce a product less efficiently than another country. What then
happens is other countries will then shift production to other areas where their
expertise and skills will be of better use maximizing efficiencies in a less
competitive environment.
George 0. White III, From Snowplows To Siopao - Trying To Compete In A Global
Marketplace: The ASEAN Free Trade Area, 8 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 177, 195-96
n.146 (2001).
147 See Tai, supra note 4, § 2, at 20 (explaining that Shenzhen was the first of the
SEZs, established in 1980; the rest were established and then all elevated to provincial
status in 1988).
148 These are also known as "Coastal Cities." See id. CEOAs have spread to
twenty-seven provinces and cities throughout the PRC. See Guo & Tao, supra note 110,
at 320.
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"open door policy" to foster trade and investment in 1984.49
There are a few important differences between SEZs and
CEOAs. SEZs were primarily formed for the purpose of "general
development."' 5 ° With this in mind, foreign capital can be
invested in many activities, such as "industry, agriculture, animal
husbandry, aquaculture, tourism, housing, the building industry,
[and] high-grade technology development,""'s' among others.
Almost all imported capital and consumer goods are exempt from
customs duties.'
Presently, in SEZs, investors pay a modest
fifteen percent income tax rate.'
Also, the Unified Foreign Tax
54
Law' implies that local taxes on foreign investors can be waived
or reduced by the local governments of the provinces and
municipalities where the SEZ exists.'
But, in order to comply
with WTO policies, government ministry officials are
contemplating phasing out the preferential tax rate in order to
harmonize domestic tax rates. 56 Ultimately, this will work to the
disadvantage of foreign companies already invested in SEZs and
create a less attractive opportunity for future foreign investors.'57
149 See Tai, supra note 4, § 2, at 20. The fourteen coastal cities are Dalian, Beihai,
Qinhuangdoa, Tianjin, Zhanjiang, Yantai, Qindao, Lianyangang, Nantong, Shanghai,
Nighbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou. Id.
150 See id.

151 Id. For example, China's Silicon Valley or Shanghai which are considered "the"
places for future high-tech development in China, and most of Asia. See Mike
Clendenin, China's Silicon Road, ELEC. ENG'G TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at 1.
152 Except for such things as alcohol and cigarettes, and other "luxury" goods. See
generally Tai, supra note 4, § 2, at 20.
153 See Curley & Fortunato, supra note 22, at 551-55; see also HENRY R. ZHENG,
CHINA'S CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW 277-80 (1988).
154 Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign
Investment and Foreign Enterprises, China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH Austl. Ltd.)
31-745 (Dec. 13, 1993). See Curley & Fortunato, supra note 22, at 546 n. 112.
155 See Curley & Fortunato, supra note 22, at 551-55 (stating that for practical
purposes, to continue to compete against other SEZs & encourage local investment, the
local authorities usually always waive or reduce taxes on FDI in these areas).
156 See James Kynge, China Ready to Scrap Tax Breaks for Foreign Companies,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2001, at 15 (stating that "the five SEZs - the booming southern
cities of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou and the island of Hainan - may find it
more difficult to attract foreign investment after they are stripped of their power to award
tax perks").
157 See id. The harmonization of local (Chinese) rules with national laws to
conform to WTO standards is a perplexing and extremely time consuming task being

N.C. J.

INT'L

L. & COM.

REG.

[Vol. 29

Nevertheless, it is clear that the tax policies will soon be revised to
reflect China's determination to be a major player within the
WTO. By not having added tax perks to draw in foreign
investment, the impact on SEZ local economies may be
immense.'58
On the other hand, within CEOAs, investment must be
"directed towards production and research, and therefore [is] most
specifically aimed at the development of new technology and new
products and industries."' 59
Correspondingly, only imported
capital goods are considered exempt from customs duties in
CEOAs. 160 Also, only approved enterprises in CEOAs, strictly in
the areas of economic and technological development, can take
advantage of the preferential tax treatment granted SEZs. 16 ' All
other enterprises not approved for the lower tax rate must pay a
higher rate of twenty-four percent. 162 Nonetheless, CEOAs will
163
also be hit by the same tax law revisions as the SEZs.
Furthermore, the pending ratification of new tax revisions
fostering harmonization of domestic tax laws, thereby complying
with WTO policies and creating a level playing field, could mildly
chill foreign investor interest in CEOAs. 64
All of these areas deal with the government's theme of
"spacial placement" and planning activities centered on the unique
qualities of each specific "Special Area. ' 165
"Spacial
carried out by relevant government authorities. See id. However, one unidentified
Chinese official asked, "Why should we continue to subject Chinese companies to
disadvantages even after we have opened our big gate to foreign competition and joined
the WTO? ...It would not be fair." Id.
158 See id.One very interesting twist here is that the inevitable tax revisions could
also sack the prevalent abuse of what is called "round-tripping." Id."'[R]ound-tripping'
[is when] Chinese groups set up shelf companies in Hong Kong, which they then use as
mainland investment vehicles in order to qualify for 'foreign' rates of tax." Id.
159 Tai, supra note 4, § 2, at 21.
160 Id.
161 See ZHENG, supra note 153, at 81.
See Huang, supra note 64, at 483.
See Kynge & Young, supra note 30, at 15.
164 See id. It must be noted that the new WTO sanctioned FDI tax policies would
most severally hurt the Chinese government's foreign investment push toward new
development zones in the West such as Lhasa & Lanzhou. See id.
165 See Lau, supra note 142, at 128; see also China Wooing FDI for Neglected
Areas, BUSINESSL1NE, Oct. 6, 2001, at 1 (describing that the ambitious Great Western
162
163
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placement...
refers to active state initiatives in site
166
selection ....
The whole idea of "spacial placement" is to
look at economic, geographical, political, and cultural
proximity.1 67 A good example of how this idea works in fostering
FDI growth is the example of Shenzhen. 168 A SEZ was established
in Shenzhen by the Chinese government and put under the newly
created Administrative Committee of the Special Economic Zones
of Guangdong Province.' 69 Because Shenzhen was within close
proximity to Hong Kong, many foreign enterprises in Hong Kong
slowly relocated their "low-tech, labour-intensive industries across
the border... stock and barrel... [so that by the early 1990s,]
96% of Shenzhen's textiles and dyeing [and] 95% of garment joint
ventures were financed by Hong Kong investors."17 Shenzhen's
incredible success comes from its geographical and economic
proximity to Hong Kong.17 ' Because of these factors, Shenzhen
has facilitated ties to a highly leveraged and developed foreign
investment pool (Hong Kong), thereby maximizing its
comparative advantages (e.g., much lower wages, relatively
modest tax rates, and vast supply of raw materials and manpower)
while taking advantage of a positively regulated investment area
(the Shenzhen SEZ) 72 This is exactly why the SEZs and CEOAs
were contrived and developed by the Chinese government regulatory efficiency that creates an investment friendly
environment.
III. Conclusion
China's investment climate has changed significantly over the
past twenty years. With its recent accession into the WTO, China

Development or "Go West" project started by the Chinese government to steer foreign
investment may be in jeopardy once domestic laws are harmonized to comply with WTO
regulations).
166 Lau, supra note 142, at 128.
167

See id.

168 See generally note 147 and accompanying text (briefly discussing Shenzhen).
169 See Pow & Moser, supra note 141, at 200. Prior to being named a SEZ,
Shenzhen was considered a "trade and investment zone." Id.
170 See Lau, supra note 142, at 129.
171

See id.

172

See id

58

N.C. J.

INT'L

L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 29

has revolutionized its global image. During this same period, the
Chinese government has established several laws and regulations
concerning foreign direct investment and international commercial
activities. Most foreign investors still perceive China as having
difficulties changing its relatively opaque, inefficient legal system
and harsh business climate. But China is pressing on with much
needed economic and legal reforms which are establishing a more
hospitable investment climate for foreign enterprises wishing to
develop projects within its borders. China's WTO membership
will only serve to accelerate this process.

